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JURIES
I. VoiR DIRE
State v. Meadows, 304 S.E.2d 831 (W. Va. 1983).
State v. Simmons, 301 S.E.2d 812 (W. Va. 1983).
State v. White, 301 S.E.2d 615 (W. Va. 1983).
State v. Toney, 301 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 1983).
In upholding defendants' rights to a trial by an impartial, unbiased jury
through effective voir dire, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ex-
tended its line of cases granting liberal voir dire privileges to include a right
to examine a prospective juror out of the presence of other jurors in at least
some instances. The court also examined the potential prejudice to the defen-
dant that may exist when the prospective juror admits to having a personal
relationship with a law enforcement or prosecutorial agent.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has, in a trio of decisions,
examined the common-law rule requiring the disqualification of potential
jurors for cause based upon their prejudicial relationships with prosecutorial
or law enforcement agencies. The court held that it was reversible error for
the trial court to deny a defendant's motion to strike a juror for cause when
voir dire revealed that this juror was the sister of a member of an agency in-
vestigating the case.' The court also held, however, that the trial court did
not err in denying a defendant's motion to strike for cause potential jurors
with more distant relationships with prosecutorial or law enforcement agen-
cies. These relationships include a "most casual" social relationship with a
testifying officer,2 and two instances of employment in criminal justice agen-
cies terminating ten years before trial.3
The right to an impartial, objective jury in a criminal trial is a fundamen-
tal right guaranteed both by the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution and article III, section 14 of the West Virginia
Constitution.' In order to assure impartiality and objectivity, common-law
rules relating to challenges for cause have been developed, and such rules
prevail in the state of West Virginia.' These rules include prima facie dis-
State v. Simmons, 301 S.E.2d 812 (W. Va. 1983).
2 State v. White, 301 S.E.2d 615 (W. Va. 1983).
'Id. See State v. Meadows, 304 S.E.2d 831 (W. Va. 1983).
State v. Peacher, 280 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1981). The United States Constitution provides
that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .. "
(U.S. CONST. amend. V.) and "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV. The West Virginia Constitution provides: "Trials of crimes,
and misdemeanors, unless herein otherwise provided, shall be by a jury of twelve men, public,
without unreasonable delay .. " W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 14.
1 It is well-settled in West Virginia that the statutory provisions of W. VA. CODE § 52-1-2
(1981) listing statutory exemptions and disqualifications do not remove the principal challenges of
1
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qualification based on kinship with either party, an interest in the case, and
membership in the same society or corporation with either party.6
In 1973 the court expanded these common-law doctrines to include
employment by the state as a potential reason for disqualification.' This effec-
tively overruled the common law, which had held that public officers are not
incompetent to serve on juries solely because of their office." While refusing
to hold that all employees of state government are prima facie disqualified to
sit on a jury in a criminal case,9 the court found:
When the defendant can demonstrate even a tenuous relationship be-
tween a prospective juror and any prosecutorial arm of state government,
defendant's challenge for cause should be sustained by the court. A defendant
is entitled to a panel of twenty jurors who are free from exception, and if
proper objection is raised at the time of impaneling the jury, it is reversible
error for the court to fail to discharge a juror who is obviously objectionable.
In any case where the trial court is in doubt, the doubt must be resolved in
favor of the defendant's challenge, as jurors who have no relation whatsoever
to the state are readily available.10
The broad holding in West was followed by the subsequent decision of State
v. Pratt," holding that friends and relatives of employees are also ques-
tionable. 2
jurors under common law. See Watkins v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 130 W. Va. 268, 43 S.E.2d 219
(1947).
1 State v. Riley, 151 W. Va. 364, 151 S.E.2d 308 (1966). The full list of causes includes:
(1) Kinship to either party within the ninth degree; (2) was an arbitrator on either side;
(3) that he has an interest in the cause; (4) that there is an action pending between him
and the party; (5) that he has taken money for his verdict; (6) that he was formerly a
juror in the same case; (7) that he is the party's master, servant, counsellor, steward, or
attorney, or of the same cause or society or corporation with him; and causes of the
same class or founded upon the same reason should be included.
Id.
State v. West, 157 W. Va. 209, 200 S.E.2d 859 (1973).
O See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 25 So.2d 44 (Ala. Ct. App. 1946) (deputy sheriff); Lugo v. State,
136 Tex. Crim. 226, 124 S.W.2d 344 (1946) (peace officer); State v. Lewis, 50 Nev. 212, 255 P. 1002
(1927) (special, privately paid deputy); Corley v. State, 162 Ark. 178, 257 S.W. 750 (1924) (mayor).
The West Virginia rule was based upon the theory that any employee of the state is a "servant of
one of the parties" and therefore disqualified to sit on the jury. State v. West, 157 W. Va. 209,
218-19, 200 S.E.2d 859, 865 (1973).
1 It appears to this Court.that there would be no reason to disqualify an elevator
operator in the State Capitol Building from sitting on a criminal jury in Kanawha
County, or to disqualify a State Road employee merely because he is an hourly employee
of the State.
State v. West, 157 W. Va. at 219-20, 200 S.E.2d at 866.
10 Id.
" 244 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1978).
,2 In Pratt, four jurors disclosed that they were related by blood or marriage to, or a close
friend of, a law enforcement officer. The trial court refused to submit individual questions to these
jurors to probe these relationships and refused to excuse the jurors. On appeal, the West Virginia
1984]
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Building upon this foundation, the court in State v. Simmons 3 held that it
is reversible error for the trial court to deny defendant's motion to strike a
juror for cause when the juror is the sister of a member of the agency in-
vestigating the case.14 William M. Simmons was on trial for possession of
marijuana with intent to sell.15 During voir dire of the panel, prospective
juror Debra Johnson disclosed that her brother was a member of the K-9
Corps at Huttonville Correctional Center.2 At the bench, defense counsel in-
formed the court that the officers who searched Simmons' residence had been
assisted by members of the canine corps, although Johnson's brother had not
been personally involved.17 Defense counsel moved to strike Johnson for
cause, but the court denied the motion.18 Simmons was convicted for posses-
sion of marijuana with intent to deliver, and appealed on the grounds that
the court's failure to strike Johnson for cause had prejudiced him, as he was
required to utilize one of his six peremptory strikes to eliminate her from the
jury panel. 9
The supreme court of appeals agreed, holding that the trial court commit-
ted reversible error by overruling the challenge for cause to juror Debra
Johnson. This error prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair and impartial
jury. The court noted that even though Johnson's brother was not involved in
this case, the canine corps took an active role in the investigation. One
member of the corps was a key witness at trial.
The court, however, found no reversible error in two other cases involv-
ing voir dire. In State v. Meadows,"1 the court found no "tenuous
relationship"' between the prosecutor and a juror who was found to have
been a prison guard ten years before the trial. 3
David Meadows was accused of first degree murder.' During voir dire, it
was discovered that a juror had been employed as a Virginia prison guard
ten years prior to his jury duty. After questioning by the defense counsel,
the trial court ascertained that the juror's former employment was not pre-
Supreme Court of Appeals held it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to present the
questions to the jurors, or, alternatively, to refuse to excuse them. Id. at 232.
'3 301 S.E.2d 812 (W. Va. 1983).
"Id. at 813.
1Id.
"Id.
17 Id.
,Id.
19 Id.
20Id.
1' 304 S.E.2d 831 (W. Va. 1983).
"See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
2 304 S.E.2d at 840.
24 Id.
[Vol. 86
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judicial to the defendent. Meadows was subsequently convicted of first
degree murder and appealed, relying on West, and claiming injury as a result
of the trial court's failure to excuse the juror for cause.26 On appeal, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, and
found that:
the fact that the juror had been employed as a guard in an out-of-state prison
ten years prior to his jury duty did not constitute such a tenuous relationship
that requires reversal for failure to discharge him for cause. Thus, . . . it was
not reversible error to permit him to be a juror where no prejudice was
shown.'
Similarly, in State v. White,28 the court found no reversible error where
two veniremen had not been excused for cause. Janie B. White was accused
of first-degree murder.' During voir dire, it was discovered that venireman
Redith Blankenship socially knew Trooper Marty Allen, who had taken part
in the investigation and would be a witness for the prosecution at trial." It
was also discovered on voir dire that venireman Robert Marcum had been a
deputy sheriff ten years earlier, and knew both Trooper Allen and Sergeant
C. R. Clinger (also an investigator in the case) from his previous
employment. 1 Both venireman Marcum and venireman Blankenship testified
that their relationships with the officers were not such that they would be
prejudiced.2 White was convicted of first degree murder, and appealed,
stating the two jurors should have been excused for cause.3
In finding that the trial court did not commit reversible error, the court
did not rely on the West line of decisions. Instead, it followed the reasoning
of State v. Kilpatrick34 and State v. Neider" regarding the relationship of a
prospective juror to any witness. In these cases, the court had held that
"[t]he true test as to whether a juror is qualified to serve on the panel is
whether without bias or prejudice he can render a verdict solely on the
evidence under the instructions of the court."38
Finding that Blankenship's relationship to Trooper Allen was "only the
2 Id.
N Id.
27 Id.
301 S.E.2d 615 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 616.
Id. at 618.
31 Irdo
32 Id.
23 Id.
N 210 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1974).
5 295 S.E.2d 902 (W. Va. 1982).
22 State v. Kilpatrick, 210 S.E.2d at 483 (quoting State v. Wilson, 157 W. Va. 1036, 1043, 200
S.E.2d 859, 865-66 (1974)).
1984]
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most casual acquaintance,"' and that employment in the sheriff's office ten
years earlier was insufficient to support a finding of prejudice,38 the court
held that it could not "conclude from the record that the veniremen to whom
defense counsel objected and who were permitted to remain on the panel
were unable to render a verdict solely on the evidence adduced during the
trial."'3
Taken together, this line of cases seems to form a continuum along which
the prejudicial nature of the relationship between a prospective juror and a
member of a prosecutorial or law enforcement agency might be measured. On
one end are relationships so close that the relationship meets the "obviously
prejudicial" standard of West. These relationships include employment as a
law enforcement officer," relationship by blood or marriage to a state
official, 1 and close friendship with a law enforcement officer."2 At this end of
the continuum, it is reversible error to overrule defendant's challenge for
cause. 3
At the other end of the continuum, relationships exist which are insuffi-
cient to support the "tenuous relationship" standard of West, unless pre-
judice is shown. Such relationships include employment in an out-of-state
prison ten years prior to jury service," employment as sheriff ten years prior
to jury service,"8 and a casual acquaintance with a testifying law enforcement
officer.46 It will not be reversible error to fail to disqualify these jurors on the
basis of relationship alone; however, prospective jurors at this end of the con-
tinuum may be disqualified if prejudice is shown."7
To the extent that factual situations fall between these two end points,
the supreme court has indicated that it will require the trial court to permit
counsel for the defense to question the prospective juror in order to deter-
mine whether such prejudice, in fact, exists. It may be reversible error for
the trial judge to forbid the opportunity for such questioning. 8 If, after ques-
tioning, ahy doubt remains as to whether the juror is prejudiced, the juror
should be excused. 9
301 S.E.2d at 618.
3S Id.
39 Id.
State v. Dye, 280 S.E.2d 323 (W. Va. 1981).
, State v. Simmons, 301 S.E.2d 812 (juror was the sister of a correctional officer); State v.
Payne, 280 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1981) (juror was the wife of the Democratic nominee for sheriff).
42 State v. Payne, 280 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 1981).
' State v. West, 157 W. Va. at 219, 200 S.E.2d at 866.
" State v. Meadows, 304 S.E.2d 831 (W. Va. 1983).
45 State v. White, 301 S.E.2d 615 (W. Va. 1983).
46 Id.
41 State v. White, 301 S.E.2d at 841. It is conceivable that there is a relationship so slight that
no question of prejudice would be raised at all.
' State v. Pratt, 244 S.E.2d at 859.
4' State v. West, 157 W. Va. at 270, 200 S.E.2d at 866.
[Vol. 86
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In State v. Toney"5 the court held that a juror is not disqualified solely by
reason of having served on a prior jury which had tried another defendant on
a similar charge with similar evidence and the same witnesses.5 However,
the trial court cannot limit the questioning of the jurors so as to prohibit the
determination of whether any prejudice or bias had been formed from the
prior trial.2 The court further indicated that individual questioning out of the
presence of the other prospective jurors may be necessary in some
instances.'
Alberta Toney was charged with delivery of a controlled substance, a
charge based in large part on testimony by Trooper D.E. Difalco that he had
purchased Methaqualone from Toney, who was working undercover. 4 Ap-
proximately one month before appellant Toney's trial, Difalco testified in the
trial of Marvin Toppings, who was charged with delivering L.S.D. to Difalco
the evening of the Toney transaction.5  During the Toppings trial, Difalco
testified about his purchase from appellant Toney, as well as about his pur-
chases from Toppings and others. Toppings was subsequently convicted. 7
Of the 29 prospective jurors who were called for appellant Toney's trial,
ten had served on the Toppings jury.' After 20 prospective jurors were
seafed in the jury box, defense counsel moved to strike for cause any
members of the panel who had served on the Toppings jury, noting that
Difalco had testified during the previous trial concerning the same purchases
for which the appellant was now being tried. Defense counsel believed nine
of the twenty had served on the Toppings jury. The judge replied that if he
struck all nine, the Clerk would have to call for additional jurors to be
brought to the court.5 The judge reserved his ruling until the conclusion of
voir dire. Defense counsel then requested that the judge poll the jurors in-
dividually about possibility of influence from the prior trial.2 The judge again
reserved his ruling.
0 301 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 1983).
5 Id. at 818.
s2 Id.
5 Id.
51 Id. at 816.
5 Id.
I Id. The testimony was as follows:
"Q You say you went to the Brotherhood club?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Who did you purchase from there?
"A I bought four qualudes off Alberta Toney. I believe it was four. Two or four...."
57 Id.
'Id.
'3 Id.
"Id.
'¢Id.
6Id.
1984]
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Upon questioning by the court, nine of the prospective jurors said they
had served on the Toppings jury.4 The judge told those nine to retire to the
jury room and discuss whether or not their prior service would influence
their decision in this case." When they returned to the courtroom the judge
questioned each juror." All replied that they were not influenced. 7 At this
time, the judge questioned the remaining jurors and discovered that one of
them had also been a member of the Toppings jury."
In chambers, defense counsel said that he would have preferred that the
court poll the jurors individually in chambers, and renewed his motion to
strike them for cause. 9 The judge denied the motion, stating that he believed
the jurors' statements under oath that they would not be influenced." Two of
the nine challenged jurors were excused on peremptory strikes, and seven
served at appellant's trial. 1
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that the judge abused
his discretion by refusing to permit counsel to question the challenged jurors
individually out of the presence of the other jurors. This questioning should
have been allowed to determine to what extent (if any) their previous ex-
posure to Difalco's testimony might have prejudiced them.72 The court
distinguished the holding of State v. Carduff,73 in which it had upheld the
seating of eight jurors in similar circumstances.74 The Carduff record showed
Id.
Id. In sending the jurors to discuss the case, the judge said in part:
I'm concerned that this case might influence you in some degree in this case and it
shouldn't, but I don't know whether you can completely separate that case from this
case or not. I'm going to ask you to do some real honest soul searching. In fact, I'm going
to take a recess for a couple of minutes and ask you to go back to the jury room and
discuss it among the nine, if you would let that influence you in the slightest degree and
I mean the very slightest degree, because if it would in all honesty ladies and gentlemen
you should not sit on this case.
Id. at 816 n.3.
Id. at 817. The questioning was conducted as follows:
"Court: Sir, would that possibly, in any degree whatsoever, influence you or might it
possibly influence you in this case?
"Juror: Absolutely not, sir.
"Court: You are absolutely positive?
"Juror: Yes, absolutely, sir. The record states that 'the remaining eight were all asked
the same question and all gave the same answer.'
Id.
Id. at 816.
SId.
SId.
70 Id.
" Id. at 816-17.
72 Id. at 818.
11 142 W. Va. 18, 93 S.E.2d 502 (1956).
7' The facts in Carduff show that the defendant was charged with selling liquor without a
[Vol. 86
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the trial court's decision was based on a thorough and careful examination of
the jurors on voir dire."s Contrasting that careful questioning to the perfunc-
tory, unreasonably restricted voir dire in this case, the court awarded Toney
a new trial."
The court in Toney relied upon earlier similar cases which had held that:
[a juror] is not disqualified to serve as [a juror in a criminal case] merely by
reason of his service as a juror or his presence as a spectator at a prior trial of
a different defendant charged with a different or similar offense, although the
evidence is similar and the witnesses in behalf of the prosecution are the same
in each case.'
The test in such cases is whether the juror can "fairly and impartially act and
render a just verdict upon the evidence adduced at trial."78 However, the
court has indicated that this "fair and impartial" standard may be violated by
showing even possible prejudice on the part of a juror.
In State v. Pratt" the court required that jurors who "indicate possible
prejudice should be excused, or should be questioned individually either by
the court or counsel to precisely determine whether they entertain bias or
prejudice for or against either party, requiring their excuse."8 Thus, while
under Carduff the juror's service in a prior trial does not automatically dis-
qualify him from sitting on a jury in a similar case, the prior service does,
under Pratt, indicate that possible prejudice exists." Individual questioning
of the potential jurors is therefore required.8 The court went even further,
however, and noted that the questioning should be done out of the presence
of the other jurors. 3
The Toney decision comes seven years after the court's decision in State
v. Pendry,4 in which the court clarified that the trial judge had the right to
examine a prospective juror out of the presence of other jurors, if he believed
license to two undercover state policemen during an evening in which the officers also purchased
illegal liquor at other establishments. Eight of the twenty prospective jurors called in Carduff's
trial had also served as jurors in two earlier trials in the same term of court, in which two other
defendants were convicted of illegal liquor sales during the same investigation. The sale by Car-
duff was testified to by officers in each of those previous trials.
7' Carduff, 142 W. Va. at 25, 93 S.E.2d at 516.
7' 301 S.E.2d at 818.
State v. Riley, 151 W. Va. 364, 385, 151 S.E.2d 308, 321 (1966) (quoting State v. Carduff, 142
W. Va. 18, 93 S.E.2d 502 (1956)).
" Carduff, 142 W. Va. 18, 93 S.E.2d 502 (1956) (syllabus point 3 by the court).
" 244 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1978).
' Id. at 228.
8" 301 S.E.2d at 818.
82 Id.
S3 Id.
8 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976).
8
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that the impartiality of the juror could be examined better in private. 5
However, the court in Pendry did not find the refusal to permit such ques-
tioning sufficient grounds for reversal.8
Because the court did not mention Pendry in its opinion, it is unclear
whether the court has entirely abandoned that decision. The line of cases ex-
tending from Pendry (1976) to Pratt (1978) to Peacher (1981) indicates the
court's increased willingness to find reversible error in limiting the scope of
voir dire. It is clear that failure to permit individual questioning of a prospec-
tive juror apart from other jurors when some reason for suspecting prejudice
exists may now be another impermissible restriction in at least some in-
stances.
II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
State v. Dameron, 304 S.E.2d 339 (W. Va. 1983).
State v. Clark, 297 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1982).
State v. Thayer, 305 S.E.2d 313 (W. Va. 1983).
State v. Mullins, 301 S.E.2d 173 (W. Va. 1983).
In its examination of jury instructions during the survey period, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals suggested that the standard for
judging prejudicial language in instructions may be the same as that used in
judging prejudicial language in closing arguments. In other cases, the court
removed all doubt as to the applicability of the 1978 rule shifting the burden
of proof in self-defense cases.
In State v. Dameron,' the supreme court of appeals examined the use of
indirectly prejudicial language in jury instructions. against the standards for
the use of such language in closing arguments. Appellant Dameron was found
not to have been prejudiced by a jury instruction mentioning the recognized
practice of "police infiltration of drug operations" in his case concerning a
single drug transaction.8
Darrell Dameron was charged with being an accessory before the fact to
the delivery of marijuana, a charge based on police officer testimony about
I The court in Pendry gave some indication of when it felt this examination might be ap-
propriate: "[S]ome inquiries may call for a juror to disclose information which might prove embar-
rassing if required to be given in open court. Also, information which may be revealed may serve
to taint an entire panel if given in the presence of the entire panel:' Id. at 217.
8 In Pendry, four members of the jury admitted to knowing various members of the dece-
dant's family. The trial judge refused to permit the defense counsel the opportunity to question
each member in chambers or away from the other members of the jury, and instead directed a
general question to the panel as a whole. The court found this "unobjectionable," although not so
desirable as a more thorough method. Id. at 215.
304 S.E.2d 339 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 342.
[Vol. 86
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his participation in a sale of the drug to an undercover agent for the West
Virginia Department of Public Safety.89 At the close of the trial, the State's
Instruction No. B was presented:
The court further instructs the jury that in drug related offenses the infiltra-
tion of drug operations and limited participation in their unlawful practices is
a recognized and permissible means of detection and apprehension."0
Dameron was convicted, and appealed objecting that the quoted instruction
was both (1) irrelevant to the issues adduced at trial, and (2) prejudicial
because it portrayed him as a part of a large scale drug ring instead of a par-
ticipant in a single drug transaction.91
The supreme court found no merit in either objection. The instruction
was relevant to the issues because the State was entitled to an instruction
explaining a police officer's role in a drug transaction.92 The court further con-
cluded that although the language of the instruction would tend to support
the trooper's credibility as a witness, it did not give undue weight to the of-
ficer's testimony, which would be erroneous under the standards of State v.
Hamrick.93
In looking to the issue of prejudice due to the inflammatory language of
the instruction, the court relied on two cases dealing with inflammatory
language in closing argument. The first, Peck v. Bez,94 had found language
clearly inflamatory when it was of the nature of a personal attack based on
the party's alleged intoxication and religious beliefs.9" The second, State v.
Dunn,"6 had found language similar to that used in this case not to be pre-
Id. at 340.
9' Id. at 341-42.
9' Id. at 342.
9 Id.
11 Id. State v. Hamrick, 236 S.E.2d 247 (W. Va. 1977). In Hamrick, the court instructed the
jury "[T]he duties of [the State Police] require them to arrest persons charged with the violation
of any Law of this State and to investigate such charges by interviewing witnesses as well as the
persons charged with the commission of said crime and that such acts on their part should not be
attacked in Court unless it appears by the evidence that they have improperly performed said
duties." (emphasis by the court) The court found this to be obviously erroneous because it directed
the jury to give extra weight to the officer's testimony. Id. at 248. See also Farrell, Communica-
tion in the Courtroom: Jury Instructions, 85 W. VA. L. Rav. 5, 55 (1982) (discussion of undue em-
phasis) (hereinafter cited as Farrell).
129 W. Va. 247, 40 S.E.2d 1 (1946).
"[D]efendant's counsel were persistent in their efforts to besmirch plaintiffs character.
Such counsel sought to show, without any justification, that plaintiff was accustomed to the use of
intoxicating liquors to excess .... Again in this closing argument, as in the examination of
witnesses, counsel compared plaintiff's nativity with that of the defendant and by innuendo, if not
direct expression, stressed and emphasized defendant's religion [Mohammedan]." Id. at 262, 40
S.E.2d at 10.
0 246 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1978).
1984]
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judicial.' In Dunn's trial for possession of a controlled substance, the prose-
cutor referred -to the State's chief witness as follows: "He went undercover at
the behest of the Bureau of Police to attempt to make some penetration of
the drug culture existing in Ohio County, West Virginia."98 Dunn appealed,
stating that the language was calculated to inflame the jury by identifying
him with the drug culture.9 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that it was not a personal attack and did not mandate reversal."'
The court concluded that appellant Dameron (vas not prejudiced by
following the same reasoning as in Dunn. "The instruction did not say that
the appellant was a member of a 'drug operation' nor is the instruction a per-
sonal attack against the appellant's character.... We therefore conclude that
there was no prejudice to the appellant from the giving of this instruction .... 101
The court, however, indicated no precise standard by which potentially pre-
judicial language in jury instructions is to be measured. By usingDunn as an ex-
ample, the court suggests that the appropriate standard is that used inDunn for
closing arguments: "[R]eversible error can occur in closing arguments when a
prosecutor directs personal attacks toward the defendant in a manner
calculated to prejudice and inflame the passions of the jurors."'0 2
The instruction in Dameron is more benign that that in Dunn. The com-
ment in Dunn mentions a specific officer going into a specific area to in-
vestigate a drug culture. The instruction in Dameron, however, merely ad-
vises jurors that officers (generally) in investigating drug operations
(generally) have been known to use this technique. In an era where
widespread questioning of police officers' methods exists, such an instruction
may be necessary to overcome the jurors' distrust of the officer's techniques.
The court's result in this case seems appropriate. The court should, however,
beware of adopting a rule appropriate for the expansive, partisan language of
closing argument for the more circumspect, neutral language of jury instruc-
tions.
Questions relating to the burden of proof in self-defense cases have been
answered in several cases during the survey period. The court has clarified
that once there is evidence to raise the question of self-defense, a self-defense
instruction must be given.0 3 It also reiterated that once the defendant has
met the threshold standard of "sufficient evidence," the burden shifts to the
state to show that the killing was not done in self-defense.", In a second case,
Id. at 249.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 249.
100 Id.
' 304 S.E.2d at 342.
12 246 S.E.2d at 249 (quoting State v. Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 57 S.E.2d 513 (1949)).
103 State v. Clark, 297 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1983).
104 Id.
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giving instructions both correctly and incorrectly stating the rule on this
point were found to be confusing and therefore reversible error.' 5 Failing to
distinctly object to a self-defense instruction was found not to preserve the
grounds for appeal,' 6 and failing to offer correct instructions on the burden of
proof for self-defense was found not to constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.'07
In State v. Clark,'0 ' the court examined the evidentiary predicate' 9 for
the self-defense instruction. Appellant Clark was charged with the shooting
death of John Wood. Wood went to appellant's trailer early in the morning
after having visited one of his painting crews at a construction site."' The
State alleged that Clark had lured Wood to her trailer, argued with him over
her suspicions that he was seeing another woman, and shot him as he sat in a
chair."' Clark contended that Wood answered the phone at her trailer, was
angered when no one responded, accused her of seeing another man, struck
her, and bruised her face. Clark then said she walked into the bedroom,
returned with the pistol, and shot Wood after a subsequent confrontation."'
No one was present at the shooting other than the appellant and the victim."'
The State contended that the appellant did not introduce sufficient
evidence to justify the giving of a self-defense instruction. 4 On appeal, the
supreme court found that there was a question of fact to be decided concern-
ing the time when appellant suffered her injury.' Therefore, the question of
self-defense was a question to be decided by the jury, and a self-defense in-
struction was proper."0
Clark also claimed that an incorrect instruction was given. The defense
offered verbatim a self-defense instruction approved by the West Virginia
court in State v. Kirtley,"7 holding that once there is "sufficient evidence in
,' State v. Thayer, 305 S.E.2d 313 (W. Va. 1983).
10 State v. Mullins, 301 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1983).
107 Id.
"' 297 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1983).
"Evidentiary predicate is a coined phrase which describes the quantum of evidence
necessary to authorize a jury instruction." Farrell, supra n.93 at 82.
"o 297 S.E.2d at 850.
" Id. at 851.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
"7 252 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1978). While the supreme court did not set forth its own instruc-
tion, it cited with favor the following federal practice rule in its entirety:
If the defendant was not the aggressor and had reasonable grounds to believe and
actually did believe that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm
from which he could save himself only by using deadly force against his assailant, he had
1984]
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the case to create a reasonable doubt that the killing resulted from the defen-
dant acting in self-defense, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.""' The trial court believ-
ed the instruction to be an incorrect statement of the law, and instead gave
an instruction which paralleled the instruction found in Kirtley to be incor-
rect."9 The incorrect instruction placed the burden of proof on the defendant
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, and did not mention the
State's burden of proof once the defendant had met the "sufficient evidence"
threshold."' The incorrect instruction was held to be reversible error, and
the case was remanded for a new trial."'
State v. Thayer" posed a slightly different question. Thayer had been
convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of David Young during an argument
growing out of Thayer's speeding past the establishment where Young was
employed as bouncer." Young had apparently tried to enter Thayer's car,
which frightened Thayer and caused him to shoot Young."
the right to employ deadly force in order to defend himself. By "deadly force" is meant
force which is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.
In order for the defendant to have been justified in the use of deadly force in self-
defense, he must not have provoked the assault on him or have been the aggressor.
Mere words, without more, do not constitute provocation or aggression.
The circumstances under which he acted must have been such as to produce in the
mind of a reasonably prudent person, similarly situated, the reasonable belief that the
other person was then about to kill him or to do him serious bodily harm. In addition,
the defendant must have actually believed that he was in imminent danger of death or
serious bodily harm and that deadly force must be used to repel it.
If evidence of self-defense is present, the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. If you find that the
government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
act in self-defense, you must find the defendant not guilty. In other words, if you have a
reasonable doubt whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense, your verdict must
be not guilty.
Id. at 831 (quoting E. DEVITT AND C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTION
MANUAL § 41.19 (3d ed. 1977)).
11 297 S.E.2d at 851 (quoting State v. Kirtley, 252 S.E.2d at 375).
,,9 297 S.E.2d at 852. The instruction given in Kirtley was as follows:
The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence in the case that the
defendant stabbed and killed David Lee Hill, and that he, the said defendant, relies upon
self-defense to excuse him from such an act, the burden of showing such excuse is on the
defendant, and to avail himself of such defense he must prove to the satisfaction of the
jury by preponderance of the evidence ....
Id. at 852 (quoting State v. Kirtley, 252 S.E.2d at 378, n.8.). The instructions in Clark were iden-
tical, with the exception of the substitution of "John Wood" for "David Lee Hill", and of "shot and
killed" for "killed."
" 297 S.E.2d at 852.
121 Id.
305 S.E.2d 313 (W. Va. 1983).
'2 Id. at 314-15.
124 Id.
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Once again the State proposed jury instructions" which were accepted
by the trial court, but which incorrectly stated the burden of proof under the
standard of Kirtley."8 The court refused to give two instructions submitted
by the defense which correctly stated the law. The defendant appealed on
the basis that the erroneous jury instructions were prejudicial.
The State admitted on appeal that its instructions were improper, but
contended that the giving of the instruction was harmless error, because the
court also gave one instruction offered by the defense on the issue of self-
defense." The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, stated
that the correct instruction, when considered by the jury along with the in-
correct State instruction, could only have created confusion in the minds of
the jurors." The conviction was reversed and a new trial awarded.130
In State v. Mullins,"' a third case arising from the self-defense question
in Kirtley, still two more issues were raised. Unlike Clark and Thayer, where
the defense counsel offered correct instructions based on Kirtley which were
subsequently refused by the court and replaced by incorrect instructions sub-
mitted by the State, Mullins had the additional problem of the defense
counsel also being unaware of the change in the burden of proof.
Bonnie Gale Mullins was convicted of the voluntary manslaughter of
Jerry Hamilton, the father of two of her children." Evidence was introduced
that on the day of the shooting, the victim had visited the defendant, quar-
reled with her, and removed the couple's two children from her home.2 He
returned later in the evening. 34 The defendant testified that they quarrelled
again, and he threatened to shoot her. 3' When he aimed a pistol at her, she
' State's Instruction 13 was:
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence in this case,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, JOSEPH A. THAYER, shot and killed
David Duane Young, and that he, the said JOSEPH A. THAYER, relies upon self-
defense to excuse him for such act, the burden of showing such excuse is on the defen-
dant, and to avail him of such defense he must prove to the satisfaction of the jury by a
preponderance of the evidence ....
Id. at 315.
212 Id.
122 One of these was based on the burden of proof: "The Court instructs the jury that once
there is sufficient evidence to create a reasonable doubt that the killing in this case resulted from
the defendant acting in self-defense, then the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not act in self-defense." Id. at 316.
123 Id.
129 Id.
1 Id.
"' 301 S.E.2d 173 (W. Va. 1983).
"3 Id. at 175.
133 Id.
23 Id. at 176.
135 Id.
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contended they struggled for it, it went off, and she killed him without mean-
ing to."'
The trial court gave an instruction which stated that if the jury believed
that the defendant shot the victim, "and that she, Bonnie Gale Mullins, relies
upon self-defense to excuse her from such act, the burden of showing such ex-
cuse is on the defendant.""' Mullins appealed on the grounds that this was an
instruction similar to the one found to be in error in Kirtley.138 In this case,
however, the defense counsel had not objected to the instruction on the
ground that it required the defense to establish self-defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, nor on the grounds that it failed to require
the State to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.", Instead, the
defense counsel had objected to the instruction on the basis that it implied in-
tent, while the defense contended the killing had been accidental.'
In State v. Gangwer,"I which followed Kirtley, the court noted that the
rule announced in Kirtley was of a nonconstitutional nature, and that for a
defendant to be entitled to relief under the principles of Kirtley, the instruc-
tion must have been objected to at trial.' It was further noted that for an ob-
jection at trial to be valid, "it must state distinctly the matters to which he
objects and the grounds for objections." '' Following Gangwer, the supreme
court held that because the defendant had objected on grounds other than
those mentioned in Kirtley, the objection did not support a reversal of
Mullins' conviction.44
Finally, Mullins claimed that she had ineffective assistance of counsel.
She based this claim primarily on defense counsel's failure to object to the
Kirtley instructions. 4' The court refused to reverse on these grounds,
measuring defense counsel's performance by the standard of State v.
Thomas:'
[C]ourts should measure and compare the questioned counsel's perfor-
mances by whether he exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill
possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law, ex-
13' Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
" 283 S.E.2d 339 (W. Va. 1981).
142 Id. at 943.
"' 301 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting State v. Gangwer, 286 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va. 1982)).
.. 301 S.E.2d at 176.
"I Id. at 177.
. 157 W. Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974).
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cept that proved counsel error which does not affect the outcome of the case,
will be regarded as harmless error.147
Applying this rule, the supreme court of appeals said that the Kirtley
decision was not a "radical change" in the law of self-defense, but only a
moderation of the instructional law on the ultimate burden of proof."" Thus,
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet the Thomas stan-
dard."'
When State v. Kirtley was decided in 1978, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals noted that the rationale of the rule was simple.5 0 "Since
self-defense is an absolute justification for a killing, once sufficient evidence
is in the case to create a reasonable doubt on this issue the state, in order to
obtain a guilty conviction, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
killing was not justified."' 5' In adopting this rule, the state joined a majority
of jurisdictions in allocating the burden of proof in this manner.1 '2 While
nothing in this year's decisions is surprising given Kirtley and its progeny,
this array of cases should erase any doubt surrounding the use and accep-
tance of the rule in this state.
Susan E. Morton
"7 Id. at 665, 203 S.E.2d at 461.
'" 301 S.E.2d at 178.
" Id Accord, Commonwealth v. Domaingue, 8 Mass. App. 228, 392 N.E.2d 1207 (1979); State
v. McNulty, 60 Hawaii 259, 588 P.2d 438 (1978).
" 252 S.E.2d at 380.
,' Id.
752 Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975); Payne v. State, 52 Ala. App. 453, 293
So. 2d 877 (1974); State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504 (Me. 1971). See generally, 9 J. WIGMoRE ON
EVIDENCE § 2512, 540 and note 6 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
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